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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
A TITLE VII SYMPOSIUM
"But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is
in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.
The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards
man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his
color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of
the land are involved."
Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT: TITLE VII AMENDED AND SECTION 1983
REVISITED
While the adoption of the Civil War constitutional amendments
may have provided the legal basis for legislation to prevent discrimi-
natory state employment practices, Congress did not enforce with
specific legislation the mandate of the equal protection clause until
the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Unfortun-
ately, the 1964 Act was a relatively innocuous law, leaving employ-
ment discrimination a private wrong to be redressed through volun-
tary agreement. Further, a constant source of problems under Title
VII was its exemption of certain classes of employees, significantly
those of state and local governments. Despite strong Southern opposi-
tion, Title VII was amended in 1972 to, inter alia, encompass the
employment practices of state and local governments.2
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970). See Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Sape & Hartl for an extensive discussion of the legislative history
of Title VII.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. 1972): "(a) The term 'person' includes ... govern-
ments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions .... "
Id. § 20 0 0 e-2: "(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
- (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
The new measure had been the primary source of contention of Southern legisla-
tors who apparently clung to outdated notions of federalism to defend discriminatory
employment practices of state government. Their fervid opposition was typified by the
comment of Senator Sam Ervin: "[Tlhe legislative proposal contained in the bill that,
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The employment practices of the states have always been subject
to federal scrutiny since Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1871, today existing in part as section 1983 of title 42 of the United
States Code. Until the amendment of Title VII the basic form of relief
for state sanctioned employment discrimination had been section
1983 which provides:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The use of section 1983 with its comprehensive set of remedies has
provided a substantial body of federal precedent invalidating state
and local employment practices. While probably not binding on Title
VII determination these decisions do show the types of discrimination
encountered and the remedies which have been found appropriate.
Unfortunately, the courts have read certain limitations into the stat-
ute which have precluded it from becoming a completely effective
remedy against discriminatory state employment practices.
Section 1983 lay dormant for nearly 100 years.' The courts at first
favored a narrow construction of it and the other Civil Rights Acts,
but in United States v. Classic,4 the United States Supreme Court
expanded the reach of the statute when it interpreted the language
"[e]very person . . .under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage of any State," as including not only those state
officials who act as authorized by state law but also those who act
contrary to state law. The Court reiterated its Classic construction
in Screws v. United States5 when it held that acts under "pretense"
of state law were actionable under a statute nearly identical to section
1983. However, in Monroe v. Pape,' the Supreme Court placed a
the EEOC be given jurisdiction over the employment practices of all States and of all
the political subdivisions of all States constitutes the most drastic assault upon our
Federal system which has been proposed in any legislative proposal to come before
Congress at any time in its history." 118 CoNG. REC. 1677 (1972); Sape & Hart at 848
n.145.
3. See Note, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1953) for a discussion of the historical develop-
ment of section 1983.
4. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
5. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964) is a criminal provision corresponding to section 1983 and
contains much of the same language.
7. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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significant limitation on the scope of section 1983 when it held that
a municipal corporation was not a "person" subject to suit within the
meaning of that statute. Thus, the individual and not the municipal
or state agency is held liable, and the action must be brought against
the particular state or local official who is directly responsible for the
action. Unfortunately, successfully joining the governmental entity
can be of great significance in damage and equity claims: The govern-
ment has a greater source of funds from which to satisfy judgments,
and in addition, forcing a governmental entity to satisfy money judg-
ments should create an incentive for it to seek out and correct wrong-
ful employment practices. Equitable relief against an entity may also
be far more effective than relief against individual officials, since an
injunction against a named governmental official can only be en-
forced against him; his successors in office would presumably then be
free to continue the discriminatory practices.'
In Monroe the Court examined the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act and concluded that Congress was "so antagonistic" to the
concept of holding cities, counties, or parishes liable the Court could
not "believe that the word 'person' was used" to include them., Since
the Monroe case dealt solely with a damage action against a munici-
pality there was considerable disagreement about the scope of the
decision. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Adams v. City of
Park Ridge0 treated Monroe as a policy decision and refused to follow
it with respect to suits in equity:
The facts in Monroe v. Pape suggests [sic] several inherent rea-
sons for excluding municipalities from liability for damages, such
as unauthorized misconduct of the officers, lack of power of city
[sic] to indemnify plaintiffs for such misconduct, and a city's
governmental immunity . . . .None of the reasons which sup-
port a city's immunity from an action for damages . . . applies
to this case."
Thus, in a section 1983 action the court enjoined the enforcement of
a municipal ordinance and declared it unconstitutional. The court
saw no policy reason "why a city and its officials should not be re-
strained from prospectively violating a plaintiff's constitutional
rights pursuant to its own legislative enactment, and an injunction
8. See Comment, 43 COLO. L. REV. 105 (1971).
9. 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961).
10. 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961). See also Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084
(7th Cir. 1969).
11. 293 F.2d at 587.
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not be granted as provided in section 1983.' '1 2 In finding Monroe
inapplicable to suits for injunctive or declaratory relief, the Seventh
Circuit chose to ignore the famous footnote 50 of the Supreme Court's
opinion in which it discussed equitable claims. 3 The Fifth Circuit
specifically limited Monroe to suits seeking damages in Harkless v.
Sweeney Independent School District. 14 In that case ten black school
teachers brought a section 1983 action against the school district,
school trustees, and superintendent for reinstatement and back pay
when their contracts were not renewed after the district was desegre-
gated. The court stated that although state law characterized the
school district as a municipality, it would allow the equitable relief
sought irrespective of Monroe. That case, the court reasoned, is bind-
ing precedent only to the extent of its ratio decidendi; that is, "no
cause of action lies against a municipality under section 1983 for
damages under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the conduct of
its police officers."'" In allowing the suit against a municipal corpora-
tion under section 1983, equity was not construed as being limited
only to suits for declaratory and injunctive relief; claims for back pay
were also allowed as elements of the equitable remedy of reinstate-
ment. 6
Just when it seemed that section 1983 did afford a meaningful
remedy against employment discrimination in state and local govern-
ments, the United States Supreme Court re-examined the relation-
ship between section 1983 and municipalities. In City of Kenosha,
Wisconsin v. Bruno,'7 appellees brought an action under section 1983
naming as defendants only the cities of Kenosha and Racine, Wiscon-
sin. For the first time since Monroe, the Court specifically addressed
the question, only alluded to in footnote 50, of whether a municipality
12. Id.
13. In referring to previous cases in which equitable relief had been granted
against parties defendant who included cities, the court cautioned: "The question
dealt with in our opinion was not raised in those cases, either by the parties or by the
Court. Since we hold that a municipal corporation is not a 'person' within the meaning
of § 1983, no inference to the contrary can longer be drawn from those cases." 365 U.S.
at 191 n.50.
14. 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970).
15. Id. at 321.
16. It had been argued that while a municipality may be sued directly for declara-
tory and injunctive relief, it may not be sued for compensatory damages (e.g., back
pay). See Sape & Hart at 849 n.155. The United States Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) concluded that the back pay issue
was not a separate legal claim but rather a part of the main equitable claim for
reinstatement and thus did not require jury determination under the seventh amend-
ment. See Johnson v. Georgia H'way Exp., Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
17. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
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is a "person" within the meaning of section 1983.18 The Court found
no justification for lower court decisions, specifically Adams, which
treated the municipality as a "person" when equitable relief was
sought.
We find nothing in the legislative history discussed in Monroe,
or in the language actually used by Congress, to suggest that the
generic word 'person' in § 1983 was intended to have a bifurcated
application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of
the relief sought against them. 9
Thus it is now clear that municipal corporations are outside the
ambit of section 1983 for the purposes of equitable relief as well as
for damage claims.
The Supreme Court also laid to rest, last term, a line of cases
using section 1988 to do what Monroe indicated that section 1983
would not allow. Section 1988 provides that where federal law is
deficient in providing a remedy for violating a person's constitutional
rights, the law of the forum shall govern.2 0 Monroe, it was claimed, is
based on a legislative history which indicated that Congress intended
to avoid interfering with the liability and immunity of municipal
governments which were to be left to the control of the states. 2' Thus,
in Carter v. Carlson,22 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
reasoned that whenever local law permits a suit for damages against
municipalities, federal courts are permitted by section 1988 to
adopt that local law when it promotes the policies behind section
1983. This approach would have been especially appealing to a
Louisiana employee because of the recent abrogation of the judici-
ally created doctrine of sovereign immunity. 23 But in Moor v. County
18. See note 14 supra.
19. 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970): "The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters con-
ferred on the district courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the
protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindica-
tion, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States,
so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where
they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to
furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modi-
fied and changed by the constitution and statutes of the states wherein the court
having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to
and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a
criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty."
21. 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961).
22. 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
23. Board at Conon'rs v. Splendour Ship. & Ent. Co., 273 So. 2d 19 (La. 1973).
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of Alameda,2 the United States Supreme Court rejected any such
use of section 1988.
Moor and Rundle brought suit against several law enforcement
officers and Alameda County for damages for injuries suffered in a
civil disturbance. Petitioners did not dispute the holding of Monroe
concerning the status of municipalities under section 1983, but
argued that if section 1983 restricts an aggrieved party from recovery,
the section cannot be considered "fully adapted" to the protection of
civil rights within the meaning of section 1988. They contended that
since the municipality was subject to liability under state law, the
federal court ought to "borrow" and apply the state rule under sec-
tion 1988. The Court flatly rejected this contention. Section 1988, it
said, does not enjoy the independent stature of an act of Congress
protecting civil rights. The role of section 1988 is only to "comple-
ment the various acts which do create federal causes of action for the
violation of federal civil rights," 5 not to create a separate cause of
action.
We cannot infer any congressional intent other than to exclude
all municipalities-regardless whether or not their immunity has
been lifted by state law-from the civil liability created in...
§ 1983 . . . .§ 1988 . . .cannot be used to accomplish what
Congress clearly refused to do in enacting § 1983.26
At one time, a frequent impediment to the prosecution of suits
under the Civil Rights Act had been the requirement that a plaintiff
exhaust state remedies before proceeding in federal court. But a trio
of cases led by Monroe have put to rest such requirement. In Monroe,
the Court said:
It is no answer that the state has a law which if enforced would
give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before
the federal one is invoked."
The Monroe decision dealt with the issue of deference to state judicial
The court held that "the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans and other
such boards and agencies are not immune from suit in tort." The full impact of the
decision is yet to be determined, but because such boards and agencies are generally
reputed to be closer to the actual sovereign (i.e., the state) than are municipal corpora-
tions, the latter are now undoubtedly subject to liability. See Comment, 34 LA. L. REV.
69, 73 (1973).
24. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
25. Id. at 702.
26. Id. at 710.
27. 365 U.S. at 183. (Emphasis added.)
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remedies in an action for damages by a black who had been abused
by the Chicago police. The Supreme Court in McNeese v. Board of
Education2 extended this holding to a case involving an inadequate
state administrative remedy. It was settled in Damico v. California2 1
that even adequate state remedies need not be pursued before federal
relief will be granted. Thus, there are no exhaustion requirements in
suits under sections 1981 and 1983.30
The terms of section 1983 make plain two elements that are
necessary for recovery. First, the plaintiff must prove that defendant
has deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States. Second, the plaintiff must show that the defen-
dant deprived him of his constitutional right "under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State of Ter-
ritory. ' '3' Castro v. Beecher12 demonstrates how statistical imbalance
is used to satisfy the first requirement and make out a case of de facto
segregation under section 1983. A prima facie case of racial discrimi-
nation is established and the burden of persuasion is shifted when it
is shown that a particular employer has a work force performing a
particular type of work in an area in which there are a large number
of persons belonging to a particular ethnic or other minority group
and the percentage of that group employed by that employer at that
work is substantially lower than the percentage of that area. 3
Once discrimination is statistically established, the courts have
fashioned appropriate remedies under section 1983. In Carter v.
28. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
29. 389 U.S. 416 (1967). In a per curiam opinion it was held that relief under the
Civil Rights Act could not be defeated because of a failure to exhaust administrative
remedies provided under state law.
30. Gillian v. Omaha, 459 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1972); James v. Ogilvie, 310 F. Supp.
661 (N.D. 11. 1970).
31. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961); Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936 (D.C. Tex. 1973). See also Adickes v. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)(holding that a mere custom without the force of state law
is not "state action.") Section 1983 protects not only constitutional rights, but also
federal statutory rights. Gomez v. Florida State Emp. Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 579 (5th
Cir. 1969).
32. 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972). "In the problem of racial discrimination statistics
often tell much and the courts listen." Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586
(5th Cir. 1962).
33. In Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, 340 F. Supp. 1351
(N.D. Cal. 1972), this principle was applied to shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant public employer. A stronger version holds that a grossly disproportionate
racial disparity in employment is, in itself, a violation of law. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F.
Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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Gallagher,3 4 a class action was brought by five blacks on behalf of
themselves and all minority persons similarly situated in the city of
Minneapolis alleging discriminatory hiring practices by the fire de-
partment. They produced evidence that of the 535 men in the fire
department none were black, Indian, or Mexican-American, and that
blacks constituted 6.44 percent of the Minneapolis population. The
court of appeals found no substantial evidence to rebut the inference
of racial discrimination based upon the statistics. Accordingly, the
court ordered that one out of every three persons hired by the fire
department be a minority person until at least twenty minority per-
sons were hired. In so holding, the court noted that notwithstanding
the anti-preference treatment section of Title VII 3 1 it is within the
power of a court to order affirmative relief to correct the effects of past
unlawful discrimination. 31
Other effective remedies are available under section 1983. Allen
v. City of Mobile31 involved a class action brought on behalf of black
police officers alleging that the city police department assigned them
patrol duties and other work on the basis of race rather than ability;
that only black officers were assigned as partners to other blacks to
ride patrol cars. The district court agreed and formulated a compre-
hensive plan for removifig all practices of racial discrimination in the
department. It imposed patrol zone assignments, pairings of black
and white officers, classroom instruction in intergroup relations, a
non-discriminatory recruitment program, and a new seniority sys-
tem .38
Now that Title VII has been amended to include coverage of
state and local governments, the question arises whether non-Title
VII causes of action alleging employment discrimination are still via-
ble. At first, private employers who had been sued under section 1981,
contended that Title VII preempted non-Title VII causes of action.3 9
34. 452 F.2d 315 (1971).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2j (Supp. 1972).
36. United States v, Local 86, Ironworkers, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); United States v. Local 86, Bridge & Ironworkers, 315 F.
Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970). See also NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala.
1972)(requiring Alabama state patrol to hire one minority group member for every non-
minority group member until demographic parity is achieved). For more extensive
discussion of minority preference in fashioning affirmative relief see this Symposium,
14 LA. LAw REV. 552 (1974).
37. 331 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
38. The use of seniority systems and selection-promotion testing is discussed at
length in this S,\'mposium, 34 LA. LAw REV. 572 (1974).
39. See, e.g., Smith v. North American Rock. Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla.
1970).
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It is now clearly settled that the specific remedies fashioned by Con-
gress in Title VII were not intended to preempt the general remedies
provided under sections 1981 or 1983.40 However, the alternative rem-
edies are not absolutely independent of each other as illustrated in
the leading case of Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International
Harvester Co.4 The Seventh Circuit held that in light of the strong
congressional policy favoring the use of conciliation techniques ex-
pressed in Title VII, a party seeking to bring suit under section 1981
must first show a "reasonable excuse"4 for failing to first proceed
through Title VII mechanisms. Similar reasoning has been followed
with respect to section 1983.11
The Fifth Circuit has taken a more liberal approach by permit-
ting a party, who deliberately by-passed EEOC administrative proce-
dures, to seek an independent remedy for employment discrimination
under section 1981.11 The court followed the Third Circuit's opinion
in Young v. International Telephone and Telegraph Co.," holding
that nothing in Title VII imposes any jurisdictional barrier to a suit
brought under section 1981. The court in Young recommended proce-
dures which would preserve the full remedy of section 1981 while
implementing the conciliatory policy at the heart of Title VII. The
court pointed to provisions in Title VII giving the district court power
to stay any relief until the conciliatory procedures to Title VII are
carried out,46 and to a section authorizing the EEOC to assist the
parties in the conciliation process even during the pendency of the
lawsuit. 7
40. Caldwell v. National Brew. Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 916 (1972); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Const. Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th
Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970); Wisc. Steel
Wks. of Int'l Harv. Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970); O'Brien v. Shrimp, 356 F. Supp.
1259 (D.C. 11. 1973); Rice v. Chrysler Corp., 327 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
41. 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
42. Id. at 487.
43. "The 'reasonable excuse' standard of Waters is somewhat more flexible than
the title 42 section 2000e-5(e) standard of EEOC administrative exhaustion. Thus the
same conduct in regard to failing to file before the EEOC may on the one hand foreclose
a Title VII suit in federal court for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, while
on the other hand be 'reasonably excusable' enough under the more liberal standard
of Waters to allow for a § 1981 or § 1983 suit." O'Brien v. Shrimp, 356 F. Supp. 1259,
1265 (E.D. Ill. 1973).
44. Caldwell v. National Brew. Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 916 (1972).
45. 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. 1972). Supposedly, conciliation will be more
successful when a preliminary injunction preserves the status quo for the aggrieved
employee. 438 F.2d at 764.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (Supp. 1972); 438 F.2d at 764 (1971).
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The reasoning in these cases, mostly directed to the relationship
between section 1981 and Title VII, is equally true for section 1983
which can be similarly reconciled with Title VII as now amended.
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments clearly indicates Con-
gress' desire to preserve non-Title VII causes of action with respect
to governmental entities.4"
The amendment of Title VII to include discriminatory employ-
ment practices by state and local governments means there are now
available alternative grounds upon which to base employee com-
plaints. In fact several courts which heard section 1983 claims prior
to the 1972 amendments utilized the jurisprudence that had devel-
oped around Title VII litigation against private employers. The court
of appeals in Castro v. Beecher,49 while recognizing that the subse-
quent expanded coverage of Title VII should not govern the purely
past conduct of the litigants, nevertheless drew upon cases decided
under provisions of Title VII applicable to private employers, such as
the Supreme Court decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,5" to strike
down racially discriminatory employment requirements and exami-
nations.
Although differing from the present case in the respect that it was
a decision under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ...
Griggs construed broad statutory language proscribing classifica-
tion of employees 'in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee because of such indi-
vidual's race' . . . . We cannot conceive that the words of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as it has been applied in [1983] cases,
demand anything less.5
Other section 1983 claims against governmental employers, although
not governed by Title VII when raised, have been scrutinized against
EEOC employment guidelines.5" Unfortunately this proposition has
48. "In establishing the applicability of Title VII to state and local employees, the
committee wishes to emphasize that the individual's right to file a civil action in its
own behalf, pursuant to the Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983, is in no way affected." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1971).
49. 459 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1972).
50. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
51. 459 F.2d at 733.
52. Chance v. Board of Exam., 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Davis v. Washington,
352 F. Supp. 187 (D.D.C. 1972); Commonwealth of Pa. v. O'Neil, 348 F. Supp. 1084
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Western Add. Comm. Org. v. Alioto, 340 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D. Cal.
1972).
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also been applied in an undesirable way. An Alabama district court,53
in a section 1983 action by blacks alleging employment discrimina-
tion by the police department, felt constrained to apply "the law
specifically adopted by Congress in reference to equal employment
opportunity, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e." 4 Although section 1983 and 2000e
are equally available to employees who have been discriminated
against, the court held:
the statutes must be construed in light of each other, and it is
obvious from a reading of § 2000e that Congress, in its infinite
wisdom, concluded that, since 100 years of remedy under § 1983
had accomplished so little, serious consideration should be given
to securing 'voluntary' compliance under the equal opportunity
law. 5
This simply is not true; debates culminating in the passage of Title
VII strongly support the conclusion that it was not intended to su-
persede existing remedies. Congress rejected an amendment that
would have made Title VII the exclusive federal remedy for employ-
ment discrimination.5"
Finally, given the varying remedies now available to an individ-
ual alleging public employment discrimination, the prospective
plaintiff faces a strategy decision of whether to pursue section 1983
or seek a Title VII remedy. Both avenues have relative advantages
and disadvantages. Title VII requires the victim of an alleged unlaw-
ful employment practice to proceed under available state statutes
and administrative remedies before a charge can be filed with the
EEOC. 7 Similarly, commencement of action before the EEOC is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to an employment practices suit under
Title VII.5 Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies
or federal administrative procedures.59 However, pursual of EEOC
53, Smiley v. City of Montgomery, 350 F. Supp. 451 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
54. Id. at 456.
55. Id.
56. 110 CONG. REC. 13650-52 (1964); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097
5t h Cir. 1970). S,',c( not e 49 supra.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. 1972); Abshire v. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R., 352
F. Supp. 601 (D.C. Il. 1972). In the recent case of Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522
(1972), the Supreme Court held that the requirement of section 2000e-5(b) could be
met by having the EEOC file a complaint on behalf of the aggrieved party with the
appropriate state agency.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. 1972); Dent v. St. Louis-San Fran. Ry., 406 F.
2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); O'Brien v. Shrimp, 356 F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. I1. 1973).
59. "If a party seeks to avoid section 2000e-5 and its exhaustion requirement and
instead pursues a perceived grievance through section 1983, which incorporates no such
[Vol. 34
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administrative procedures makes available to the aggrieved individ-
ual EEOC investigative reports not available to non-Title VII liti-
gants. 0 Undoubtedly, recent United States Supreme Court decisions
render section 1983 a less desirable remedy against public employers
than it once promised to be. Claims for back pay, once recoverable
under the equitable remedy distinction, probably will be unsuccessful
in section 1983 actions. Title VII, on the other hand, specifically
authorizes both claims for back pay" and attorney's fees. 2
Alan Schulman
requirement, that is his prerogative." O'Brien v. Shrimp, 356 F. Supp. 1259, 1264 (E.D.
I1. 1973). See text accompanying note 31 supra.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (Supp. 1972). But see H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472
F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1973).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(Supp. 1972).
62. Id. § 2000e-5(k)(Supp. 1972).
